Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141584 
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9825
Publisher: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
In many countries, general practitioners (GPs) are assigned the task of controlling the validity of their own patients' insurance claims. At the same time, they operate in a market where patients are customers free to choose their GP. Are these roles compatible? Can we trust that the gatekeeping decisions are untainted by private economic interests? Based on administrative registers from Norway with records on sick pay certification and GP-patient relationships, we present evidence to the contrary: GPs are more lenient gatekeepers the more competitive is the physician market, and a reputation for lenient gatekeeping increases the demand for their services.
Subjects: 
absenteeism
gatekeeping
competition
role-conflicts
JEL: 
H55
I11
I18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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