Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141572 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 9813
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We expand Acemoglu and Pischke's seminal model of training in imperfect labor markets by including the system of collective wage bargaining and the components of firms' training costs. Thus we can adapt their model to institutional changes that occurred since the 1990s. The model and the empirical developments we present show that firms compensate lower returns of apprenticeship training by changing training procedures towards more training at the work place and thus by decreasing net training costs. Therefore, more decentralized wage bargaining does not result in a reduction of firms' supply of training positions.
Schlagwörter: 
apprenticeship training
training in imperfect labor markets
wage compression
JEL: 
J24
J31
J52
I21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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