Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141572
Authors: 
Neubäumer, Renate
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 9813
Abstract: 
We expand Acemoglu and Pischke's seminal model of training in imperfect labor markets by including the system of collective wage bargaining and the components of firms' training costs. Thus we can adapt their model to institutional changes that occurred since the 1990s. The model and the empirical developments we present show that firms compensate lower returns of apprenticeship training by changing training procedures towards more training at the work place and thus by decreasing net training costs. Therefore, more decentralized wage bargaining does not result in a reduction of firms' supply of training positions.
Subjects: 
apprenticeship training
training in imperfect labor markets
wage compression
JEL: 
J24
J31
J52
I21
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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