Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/141342 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Citation: 
[Journal:] Wirtschaftsdienst [ISSN:] 1613-978X [Volume:] 94 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Springer [Place:] Heidelberg [Year:] 2014 [Pages:] 203-209
Publisher: 
Springer, Heidelberg
Abstract: 
Der Koalitionsvertrag der neuen Regierungskoalition sieht vor, einen eventuellen Zusatzbeitrag defizitärer Krankenkassen nicht wie bisher als pauschale Prämie, sondern einkommensabhängig zu erheben. Die Autoren zeigen auf, in welchem Umfang unterschiedliche Einkommen dadurch belastet werden. Sie kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Gruppe mit hohen Einkommen einen stärkeren Anreiz hat, die Krankenkasse zu wechseln. Ärmere Versicherte verlieren mit der Reform an Marktmacht.
Abstract (Translated): 
Since 2011 German health insurance funds have had to raise additional lump-sum contributions from members in case of insufficient allotment from the central health funds. The new German government plans to replace the lump-sum contributions with wage-related ones. Despite its contrary intentions, we argue that this reform would actually hurt poor members of health insurance funds and decrease their market power. Due to this reform and the well-known relationship between income and health, health insurances funds will increase their adverse competition for higher income households.
JEL: 
I10
I13
I18
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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