Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141305
Authors: 
Eichler, Stefan
Lähner, Tom
Noth, Felix
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
IWH Discussion Papers 15/2016
Abstract: 
This study analyzes if regionally affiliated Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members take their districts' regional banking sector instability into account when they vote. Considering the period from 1978 to 2010, we find that a deterioration in a district's bank health increases the probability that this district's representative in the FOMC votes to ease interest rates. According to member-specific characteristics, the effect of regional banking sector instability on FOMC voting behavior is most pronounced for Bank presidents (as opposed to governors) and FOMC members who have career backgrounds in the financial industry or who represent a district with a large banking sector.
Subjects: 
FOMC voting
regional banking sector instability
lobbying
JEL: 
E43
E52
E58
G21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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