Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/140888
Authors: 
Walterscheid, Heike
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Ausschusses für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik im Verein für Socialpolitik: "Marktwirtschaft im Lichte möglicher Alternativen", 27.-29. September 2015, Bayreuth
Abstract (Translated): 
Performance of market coordination crucially depends on the quality of property rights as a bundle of several acting rights. Since acting rights can be created, changed or abandoned within the political system, the scopes of political decision making processes have a deep impact on the quality of property rights respectively on the quality and form of property The source of a faulty structure of acting rights can be found on the constitutional level of a societal system. Politicians are enabled to arbitrarily transform the structure of acting rights in capitalism from a more or less decentralized structure into centralized structures of acting rights found in socialism. Thus, in the context of rent seeking and lobbyism a wide range of discretionary political decision making options will adversely affect market coordination and therefore the distribution of wealth.
Subjects: 
Property Rights
Rules Regulation
Market Economy
Externalities
Lobbyism
Sovereignty
Liability
Structural Couplings
Public Choice
Fractionation
Democracy
Political Participation
Preferences
Social Systems
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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