Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/140742 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
TIGER Working Paper Series No. 90
Verlag: 
Transformation, Integration and Globalization Economic Research (TIGER), Warsaw
Zusammenfassung: 
In many transition economies, insiders controlled state-owned firms, de facto. For such firms, we model the decision about privatization method, focusing on the choice between free distribution (so called 'mass privatization') and management-employee buyouts. We incorporate a political feasibility constraint that the revenue-maximising government cannot pay insiders to take firms off its hands. Although mass privatization apparently conflicts with revenue maximization, we show that nonetheless it may be the preferred method, and if so it will be complementary with the state continuing to own shares. Mass privatization is more likely to be chosen if the government is politically weak.
Schlagwörter: 
Corruption
Bureaucratic Structure
Developing Economy
JEL: 
D73
H11
H77
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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