Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/140635
Authors: 
Pichler, Stefan
Ziebarth, Nicolas
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Upjohn Institute Working Paper 15-239
Abstract: 
This paper proposes a test for the existence and degree of contagious presenteeism and negative externalities in sickness insurance schemes. First, we theoretically decompose moral hazard into shirking and contagious presenteeism behavior and derive testable conditions. Then, we implement the test exploiting German sick pay reforms and administrative industry-level data on certified sick leave by diagnoses. The labor supply adjustment for contagious diseases is significantly smaller than for noncontagious diseases. Lastly, using Google Flu data and the staggered implementation of U.S. sick leave reforms, we show that flu rates decrease after employees gain access to paid sick leave.
Subjects: 
Sickness Insurance
Paid Sick Leave
Presenteeism
Contagious Diseases
Infections
Negative Externalities
Shirking
United States
Germany
JEL: 
I12
I13
I18
J22
J28
J32
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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