Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130838
Authors: 
Gneezy, Uri
Saccardo, Silvia
van Veldhuizen, Roel
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2016-203
Abstract: 
It is estimated that a trillion dollars are annually exchanged in bribes, distorting justice and economic efficiency. In a novel experiment, we investigate the drivers of bribery. Two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her judgment. An extra-laboratory experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. Hence, our participants are influenced by bribes out of greed, and not because of a desire to reciprocate.
Subjects: 
Bribery
Reciprocity
Laboratory Experiment
Extra-Laboratory experiment
JEL: 
D73
C91
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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