Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/130821 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Serie Documentos de Trabajo No. 570
Verlag: 
Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires
Zusammenfassung: 
To help incorporate natural language into economic theory, this paper does two things. First, the paper extends to imperfect information games an equilibrium concept developed for incomplete information games, so natural language can be formalized as a vehicle to convey information about actions as well as types. This equilibrium concept is specific to language games, because information is conveyed by the sender through the message's literal meaning. Second, the paper proposes an equilibrium refinement which selects the sender's most preferred equilibrium. The refinement captures the notion that the speaker seeks to improve its status quo, aiming at optimal relevance. Explicit coordination through verbal communication parallels the idea of implicit coordination through focal points.
Schlagwörter: 
cheap talk
signs
semantics
pragmatics
relevance
equilibrium selection
JEL: 
D83
C72
ISBN: 
978-987-1062-99-7
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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