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Autoren: 
Bouton, Laurent
Castanheira, Micael
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
Datum: 
2015
Reihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper 777
Zusammenfassung: 
We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical predictions that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup, AV should produce close to first-best outcomes, while plurality will not. The experiment shows, first, that welfare gains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions, and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behavior under AV highlights the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies.
Schlagwörter: 
Multicandidate elections
Information aggregation
Plurality
Approval Voting
Laboratory experiments
JEL: 
C72
C92
D70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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