Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130791
Authors: 
Bouton, Laurent
Castanheira, Micael
Llorente-Saguer, Aniol
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary University of London 777
Abstract: 
We propose a theory-based experimental approach to compare the properties of approval voting (AV) with those of plurality. This comparison is motivated by the theoretical predictions that, in our aggregate uncertainty setup, AV should produce close to first-best outcomes, while plurality will not. The experiment shows, first, that welfare gains are substantial. Second, both aggregate and individual responses are in line with theoretical predictions, and thus with strategic voting. Finally, subjects' behavior under AV highlights the need to study equilibria in asymmetric strategies.
Subjects: 
Multicandidate elections
Information aggregation
Plurality
Approval Voting
Laboratory experiments
JEL: 
C72
C92
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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