Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130743
Authors: 
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
McLean, Richard P.
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey 2015-13
Abstract: 
We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.
Subjects: 
Bayesian game
discontinuous game
infinite game of incomplete information
behavioral strategy
distributional strategy
payoff security
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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