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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2015-04
Verlag: 
Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics, Ramat-Gan
Zusammenfassung: 
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting 'graph value' (and 'S-value' in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.
Schlagwörter: 
Shapley value
network games
JEL: 
C71
D46
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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