Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130537
Authors: 
Hellman, Ziv
Peretz, Ron
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2015-04
Abstract: 
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting 'graph value' (and 'S-value' in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.
Subjects: 
Shapley value
network games
JEL: 
C71
D46
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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