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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5853
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we study the behavior of rivals when there is a known probability of imminent entry. Experimental markets are used to collect data on pre- and post-entry production when there is an announced time of possible entry; some markets experience entry and other do not. In all pre-entry markets competition is more intense. Post-entry behavior in all markets is more competitive compared to a baseline that had no threat. There is evidence that post-entry multimarket contact raises outputs in those markets that did not experience entry, behavior we generally refer to as a conduit effect.
Schlagwörter: 
entry
rivalry
market experiments
JEL: 
L10
L40
C90
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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