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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5850
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
By introducing controlled-foreign-company (CFC) rules, the parent country of a multinational firm reserves the right to tax the income of the firm’s foreign affiliates if the tax rate in the affiliate’s host country is below a specified threshold. We identify the conditions under which binding CFC rules are part of the optimal tax mix when governments can set the statutory tax rate, a thin capitalization rule and the CFC rule. We also analyze the effects of economic and financial integration on the optimal policy mix. Our results correspond to the actual development of anti-avoidance rules in OECD countries.
Schlagwörter: 
multinationals
profit shifting
controlled foreign company rules
thin capitalization rules
JEL: 
H25
H73
F23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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