Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/130390
Authors: 
Spiller, Jörg
Bolle, Friedel
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, European University Viadrina, Department of Business Administration and Economics 383
Abstract: 
In a laboratory experiment we investigate inter-generational concerns and myopia in a dynamic Public Good game. Groups of four played a 15-period game where they could either invest in a green sector or in a more profitable brown sector that builds a pollution stock. We find that subjects are more cooperative when their final pollution stock will be inherited by another group in a later session. Furthermore, we observe that defection from a negotiated common plan is higher when subjects are in a loss frame, negotiated plans are more ambitious. We analyze our results in reference to several social preference theories and find that Linear Altruism is most supported in such a dynamic environment.
Subjects: 
Dynamic
Environmental Economics
Experimental Economics
Inter-Generation
Public Good
JEL: 
H41
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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