Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129984
Authors: 
Cartwright, Edward
Stepanova, Anna
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
School of Economics Discussion Papers 1506
Abstract: 
We contrast and compare three ways of predicting efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. The three alternatives are based on ordinal potential, quantal response and impulse balance theory. We report an experiment designed to test the respective predictions and find that impulse balance gives the best predictions. A simple expression detailing when enforced contributions result in high or low efficiency is provided.
Subjects: 
public good
threshold
impulse balance theory
quantal response
forced contribution
ordinal potential
JEL: 
C72
H41
C92
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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