Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129964
Authors: 
de Melo, Gioia
Piaggio, Matías
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Banco de México 2015-12
Abstract: 
We provide experimental evidence on the effects of social disapproval by peers among communities of Uruguayan small-scale fishers exploiting a common pool resource (CPR). We combined this treatment with an in-group (groups from a single community) / mixed group (groups composed of fishers from different communities) treatment. We find that mixed groups, unlike in-groups, reduce their exploitation of the resource in response to the threat of punishment. Both in in-groups and mixed groups there is substantial antisocial punishment, which leads to increased extraction of the CPR by those who are unfairly punished. These findings indicate that effective peer punishment requires coordination to prevent antisocial targeting and to clarify the social signal conveyed by punishment.
Subjects: 
social disapproval
social preferences
common pool resource
desaprobación social
preferencias sociales
recurso de uso común
JEL: 
D03
O12
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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