Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129876
Authors: 
Csercsik, Dávid
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IEHAS Discussion Papers MT-DP - 2015/11
Abstract: 
Optimal power flow (OPF) problems are focussing on the question how a power transmission network can be operated in the most economic way. The general aim in such scenarios is to optimize generator scheduling in order to meet consumption re-quirements, transmission constraints and to minimize the overall generation cost and transmission losses. We use a simple lossless DC load flow model for the description of the transmission network, and assume linearly decreasing marginal cost of generators with different parameters for each generator. We consider a scenario in which the generation values regarding the OPF are calculated by a central authority who is aware of the network parameters and production characteristics. Furthermore, we assume that a central mechanism is applied for the determination of generator payoffs in order to cover their generation costs and assign them with some profit. We analyze the situation when generators may provide false information about their production parameters and thus manipulate the OPF computation in order to potentially increase their resulting profit. We consider two central payoff mechanisms and compare their vulnerability for such manipulations and analyze their effect on the total social cost.
Subjects: 
networks
manipulability
power transmission
optimal power flow
JEL: 
C71
L14
L94
ISBN: 
978-615-5447-70-9
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
277.39 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.