Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129820
Authors: 
D'Adda, Giovanna
Drouvelis, Michalis
Nosenzo, Daniele
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2015-02
Abstract: 
We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment.
Subjects: 
social norms
norm elicitation
order effects
within-subject design
corruption
bribe game
JEL: 
C91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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