Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129816
Authors: 
Hartig, Björn
Irlenbusch, Bernd
Kölle, Felix
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series 2014-12
Abstract: 
We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is particularly strong when others' individual contributions are relatively homogeneous. When both types of information are provided, this effect is moderated. In the case of individual feedback we find the willingness to contribute to be higher the lower the variation in others' contributions, but with pronounced heterogeneity in individuals' reactions. While the majority of conditional cooperators' are mainly guided by others' average contributions, more people follow the bad example of a low contributor than the good example of a high contributor. Overall, we provide evidence that information (and lack thereof) about others' individual contributions affects conditional cooperators' willingness to cooperate in systematic ways.
Subjects: 
Conditional cooperation
Information
Heterogeneity
Public goods
Experiments
JEL: 
H41
C91
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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