Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129668
Authors: 
Götz, Martin R.
Tröger, Tobias
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
White Paper Series 35
Abstract: 
An important prerequisite for the efficiency of bail-in as a regulatory tool is that debt holders are able to bear the cost of a bail-in. Examining European banks' subordinated debt we caution that households may be investors in bail-in able bonds. Since households do not fulfil the aforementioned prerequisite, we argue that European bank supervisors need to ensure that banks' bail-in bonds are held by sophisticated investors. Existing EU market regulation insufficiently addresses mis-selling of bail-in instruments.
Subjects: 
bail-in
BRRD
subordinated debt
EU market regulation
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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