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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 1099
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyse how the market design influences the bidding behaviour in multi-unit auctions, such as wholesale electricity markets. It is shown that competition improves for increased market transparency and we identify circumstances where the auctioneer prefers uniform to discriminatory pricing. We note that political risks could significantly worsen competition in hydro-dominated markets. It would be beneficial for such markets to have clearly defined contingency plans for extreme market situations.
Schlagwörter: 
cost uncertainty
asymmetric information
uniform-price auction
discriminatory pricing
Bertrand game
market transparency
wholesale electricity market
treasury auction
Bayesian Nash equilibria
JEL: 
C72
D43
D44
L13
L94
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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