Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129658
Authors: 
Zhou, Wen
Koptyug, Nikita
Ye, Shutao
Jia, Yifan
Lu, Xiaolong
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 1097
Abstract: 
As computer science and complex network theory develop, non-cooperative games and their formation and application on complex networks have been important research topics. In the inter-firm innovation network, it is a typical game behavior for firms to invest in their alliance partners. Accounting for the possibility that firms can be resource constrained, this paper analyzes a coordination game using the Nash bargaining solution as allocation rules between firms in an inter-firm innovation network. We build an extended inter-firm n-player game based on nonidealized conditions, describe four investment strategies and simulate the strategies on an inter-firm innovation network in order to compare their performance. By analyzing the results of our experiments, we find that our proposed greedy strategy is the best-performing in most situations. We hope this study provides a theoretical insight into how firms make investment decisions.
Subjects: 
Complex Networks
Game Theory
Innovation
Innovation Network
Nash Equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
C81
C82
D81
L14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.