Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129586
Authors: 
Mailath, George J.
Nocke, Volker
White, Lucy
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim 15-04
Abstract: 
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu,1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of settings in which a subgame-perfect outcome may be supported only by a profile with the property that the continuation play after a deviation is tailored not only to the identity of the deviator, but also to the nature of the deviation.
Subjects: 
Simple Penal Code
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Repeated Extensive Game
Optimal Punishment
JEL: 
C70
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
192.26 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.