Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Li, Sanxi
Peitz, Martin
Zhao, Xiaojian
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim 14-28
Whether consumers are aware of potentially adverse product effects is key to private and social incentives to disclose information about undesirable product characteristics. In a monopoly model with a mix of aware and unaware consumers, a larger share of unaware consumers makes information disclosure less likely to occur. Since the firm is not interested in releasing information to unaware consumers, a more precise targeting technology that allows the firm to better keep unaware consumers in the dark leads to more disclosure. A regulator may want to intervene in this market and impose mandatory disclosure rules.
Information disclosure
informative advertising
targeted advertising
consumer awareness
behavioral bias
non-common prior
consumer protection
behavioral industrial organization
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
447.82 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.