Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129579 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 14-26
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide elementary insights into the effectiveness of certification to increase market transparency. In a market with opaque product quality, sellers use certification as a signaling device, while buyers use it as an inspection device. This difference alone implies that seller-certification yields more transparency and higher social welfare. Under buyer-certification profit maximizing certifiers further limit transparency, but because seller-certification yields larger profits, active regulation concerning the mode of certification is not needed. These findings are robust and widely applicable to, for instance, patents, automotive parts, and financial products.
Schlagwörter: 
Market Transparency
Certification
Information and Product Quality
Asymmetric Information
JEL: 
D82
G24
L15
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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