Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129575 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 14-22
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop a model of interlocking bilateral relationships between upstream firms (manufacturers)that produce differentiated goods and downstream firms (retailers) that compete imperfectly for consumers. Contract offers and acceptance decisions are private information to the contracting parties. We show that both exclusive dealing and vertical integration between a manufacturer and a retailer lead to vertical foreclosure, to the detriment of consumers and society. Finally, we show that firms have indeed an incentive to sign such contracts or to integrate vertically.
Schlagwörter: 
vertical relations
exclusive dealing
vertical merger
foreclosure
bilateral contracting
JEL: 
L13
L42
D43
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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