Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129566
Authors: 
Hedges, Jules
Oliva, Paulo
Winschel, Evguenia
Winschel, Viktor
Zahn, Philipp
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Mannheim 14-13
Abstract: 
We use quantifiers and selection functions to represent simultaneous move games. Quantifiers and selection functions are examples of higher-order functions. A higher order function is a function whose domain is itself a set of functions. Thus, quantifiers and selection func- tions allow players to form goals not only about outcomes but about the whole (or parts) of the game play. They encompass standard pref- erences and utility functions as special cases, but also extend to non-maximizing behavior and context-dependent motives. We adapt the Nash equilibrium concept to our new representation and also introduce a refinement to capture the essential features of context-dependent motives. As an example, we discuss fixpoint operations as context dependent goals of coordination and differentiation in simultaneous game variants of Keyne's beauty contest and the minority game.
Subjects: 
context dependent refinement of Nash equilibrium
higher order functions
quantifiers
selection functions
beauty contest
minority game
endogenous economist
JEL: 
C0
D01
D03
D63
D64
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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