Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129549 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 13-07r
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
In most laboratory experiments concerning prosocial behavior subjects are fully informed how their decision influences the payoff of other players. Outside the laboratory, however, individuals typically have to decide without such detailed knowledge. To asses the effect of information asymmetries on prosocial behavior, we conduct a laboratory experiment with a simple non-strategic interaction. A dictator has only limited knowledge about the benefits his prosocial action generates for a recipient. We observe subjects with heterogenous social preferences. While under symmetric information only individuals with the same type of preferences transfer, under asymmetric information different types transfer at the same time. As a consequence and the main finding of our experiment, uninformed dictators behave more prosocially than informed dictators.
Schlagwörter: 
Asymmetric Information
Prosocial Behavior
Efficiency Concern
Inequality Aversion
Dictator Game
JEL: 
D82
C91
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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