Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129546 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper Series No. 13-04
Verlag: 
University of Mannheim, Department of Economics, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Should managers be liable for ill-conceived business decisions? One answer is given by U.S. courts, which almost never hold managers liable for their mistakes. In this paper, we address the question in a theoretical model of delegated decision making. We find that courts should indeed be lenient as long as contracts are restricted to be linear. With more general compensation schemes, the answer depends on the precision of the court's signal. If courts make many mistakes in evaluating decisions, they should not impose liability for poor business judgment.
Schlagwörter: 
business judgment rule
manager liability
delegated decision-making
JEL: 
K13
K22
M53
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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