Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129361
Authors: 
Dur, Umut Mert
Ünver, M. Utku
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Koç University-TÜSİAD Economic Research Forum Working Paper Series 1508
Abstract: 
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which each firm has to avoid being a net-exporter of workers. These exchanges use decentralized markets, making it difficult to achieve a balance between exports and imports. We show that stable equilibria discourage net-exporting firms from exchange. We introduce the two-sided top-trading-cycles mechanism that is balanced-efficient, worker-strategy-proof, acceptable, and individually rational, and respects priority bylaws regarding worker eligibility. We prove that it is the unique mechanism fulfilling these objectives. Moreover, it encourages exchange, since full participation is the dominant strategy for firms.
Subjects: 
Market Design
Matching Theory
Tuition Exchange
Worker Exchange
Balanced Exchange
Two-sided Matching
Two-sided Top Trading Cycles
JEL: 
C71
C78
D71
D78
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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