Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129102
Autoren: 
Danz, David Nils
Huck, Steffen
Jehiel, Philippe
Datum: 
2015
Reihe/Nr.: 
WZB Discussion Paper SP II 2016-201
Zusammenfassung: 
We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they make use of this information even if it is less precise than their own private statistics - except for very high stakes. Making public information more precise has two consequences: It is also used when the stakes are very high and it reduces the number of subjects who ignore any information - public and private. That is, precise public information crowds in the use of own information. Finally, our results shed some light on unravelling in centipede games.
Schlagwörter: 
backward induction
analogy-based expectation equilibrium
learning
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
D83
D84
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Nennungen in sozialen Medien:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
599.57 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.