Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129063
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 127
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
Schlagwörter: 
treasury auctions
multi-unit auctions
independent private values
competition
bidder surplus
auction format
JEL: 
D44
G12
G21
L10
L13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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