Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/129063
Authors: 
Elsinger, Helmut
Schmidt-Dengler, Philipp
Zulehner, Christine
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
SAFE Working Paper Series 127
Abstract: 
We investigate the role of competition on the outcome of Austrian Treasury auctions. Austria's EU accession led to an increase in the number of banks participating in treasury auctions. We use structural estimates of bidders' private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction performance: We find that increased competition reduced bidder surplus substantially, but less than reduced form estimates would suggest. A significant component of the surplus reduction is due to more aggressive bidding. Counterfactuals establish that as competition increases, concerns regarding auction format play a smaller role.
Subjects: 
treasury auctions
multi-unit auctions
independent private values
competition
bidder surplus
auction format
JEL: 
D44
G12
G21
L10
L13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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