Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/129036 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2014
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIFO Working Papers No. 487
Verlag: 
Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), Vienna
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical evidence to explain the occurrence of tax amnesties. We treat amnesties as endogenous, resulting from a strategic game between many tax payers discounting future payments from punishment and a government that trades off costs and benefits of amnesty programmes. From the model we derive hypotheses about the factors that should influence the occurrence of tax amnesties. For our empirical test we rely on amnesty information from US states between 1981 and 2011. In line with the theoretical model, our empirical findings suggest that the likelihood of amnesties is mainly driven by a government's fiscal requirements and the taxpayers' expectations on future amnesties.
Schlagwörter: 
tax amnesties
strategic game
US states
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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