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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 02/2015
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis regarding strategic interaction under expectation-based loss-aversion. First, we develop a coherent framework for the analysis by extending the equilibrium concepts of Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) to strategic interaction and demonstrate how to derive equilibria. Second, we delineate how expectation-based loss-averse players differ in their strategic behavior from their counterparts with standard expected-utility preferences. Third, we analyze equilibrium play under expectation-based loss aversion and comment on the existence of equilibria.
Schlagwörter: 
Non-Cooperative Games
Expectation-Based Loss Aversion
Reference-Dependent
JEL: 
C72
D01
D03
D81
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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