Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128454
Authors: 
Gould, Matthew
Rablen, Matthew
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5750
Abstract: 
In recent years tax authorities worldwide have implemented voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. Such Schemes are characterized by the acquisition of non-audit information on offshore holdings, and a subsequent opportunity for affected taxpayers to make a voluntary disclosure. Accepted disclosures are subject to a discounted .ne rate, but verified under-disclosure attracts a higher penalty. We characterize the optimal Scheme and show that an optimal Scheme can generate a Pareto-improvement over the optimal auditing equilibrium without a Scheme, and can stimulate legitimate offshore investment activity. We show when a tax authority optimally gives incentives for truthful disclosure, and when it does not. The analysis yields practical design insights for policymakers.
Subjects: 
voluntary disclosure
offshore tax evasion
tax amnesty
third-party information
JEL: 
H26
D85
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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