Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128417
Authors: 
Buchholz, Wolfgang
Sandler, Todd
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5717
Abstract: 
Since Olson’s (1965) The Logic of Collective Action, the exploitation hypothesis, in which the rich shoulders the provision burden of public goods for the poor, has held sway despite empirical exceptions. To address such exceptions, we establish two alternative exploitation hypotheses based on asymmetric preferences or on productivity differences regarding the public good. The classic hypothesis and its two variants are proven in a novel fashion. Our theoretical insights are then illustrated by some empirical examples from the field of international public goods, such as military defence and cross-border pollution.
Subjects: 
public goods
exploitation hypothesis
JEL: 
F53
H41
H87
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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