Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/128416 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2016
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 5718
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
In higher education, pure credit market funding leads to underinvestment due to insufficient risk pooling, while pure income-contingent loan funding leads to overinvestment. We analyze whether funding diversity – a market structure in which credit markets coexist alongside income-contingent loan funding – might restore efficiency of the educational investment process. In the absence of government intervention, we find that funding diversity improves pooling of individual income risks and, under some condition, leads to higher social welfare than pure credit market funding. If combined with a policy that restricts access to higher education, funding diversity even achieves full investment efficiency and strictly dominates credit market funding.
Schlagwörter: 
higher education
funding diversity
human capital formation
JEL: 
D31
H31
I22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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