Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128412
Authors: 
Galletta, Sergio
Year of Publication: 
2016
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5707
Abstract: 
In this paper, I empirically investigate the presence of spillover effects resulting from the strengthening of law enforcement against corruption and organized crime in local governments. Specifically, I take advantage of an Italian law that gives power to the central government to replace democratically elected municipal officials who are potentially connected with mafia with a commission of non-elected administrators. Fixed effects model estimates that focus on a sample of municipalities from three Italian regions (Campania, Calabria and Sicilia) for the period 1998 to 2013 show that the city council dismissal of a municipality fosters a reduction in public investments in neighboring municipalities. Additional empirical evidence suggests that this result could be explained by the presence of law enforcement spillovers potentially reducing misconducts in neighboring municipalities.
Subjects: 
horizontal interaction
Italy
mafia
corruption
JEL: 
D73
E62
E72
K42
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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