Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128359
Authors: 
Kovenock, Dan J.
Roberson, Brian
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper 5653
Abstract: 
Maintaining the security of critical infrastructure networks is vital for a modern economy. This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of a network in which the defender’s objective is to maintain network connectivity and the attacker’s objective is to destroy a set of nodes that disconnects the network. The conflict at each node is modeled as a contest in which the player that allocates the higher level of force wins the node. Although there are multiple mixed-strategy equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the players’ multivariate joint distributions of force across nodes that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy in which a single random [minimal] set of nodes that disconnects the network is attacked.
Subjects: 
allocation game
asymmetric conflict
attack and defense
Colonel Blotto Game
network connectivity
weakest-link
best-shot
JEL: 
C72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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