Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128072
Authors: 
Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín
Niepelt, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper, Study Center Gerzensee 12.02
Abstract: 
We extend "economic equivalence" results, like the Ricardian equivalence proposition, to the political sphere where policy is chosen sequentially. We derive conditions under which a policy regime (summarizing admissible policy choices in every period) and a state are "politico-economically equivalent" to another such pair, in the sense that both pairs give rise to the same equilibrium allocation. We apply the conditions in the context of politico-economic theories of government debt as a means to i) deliver intergenerational transfers or ii) smooth tax distortions. We find that certain politico-economic models of social security or variants thereof can be re-interpreted as novel politico-economic theories of debt while other models cannot, possibly explaining the political conflict surrounding social security reform. We also find that in environments with distorting taxes, economic equivalence relations between policies with different levels of debt do not extend to the political sphere.
Subjects: 
Equivalence
social security
government debt
social security reform
JEL: 
E62
H55
H63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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