Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127530
Authors: 
Stutzer, Alois
Braendle, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
WWZ Forschungsbericht 08/09
Abstract: 
This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public service and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the strong representation of public servants in many Western parliaments compromises the constitutionally proposed political neutrality of the public service and generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. Based on a novel data set, we find that incompatibility rules decrease and abeyance compensation increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.
Subjects: 
Political selection
Parliamentary election
Public servants
Incompatibility
JEL: 
D72
D73
H11
H83
Document Type: 
Research Report

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