Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127475
Authors: 
Karbowski, Adam
Prokop, Jacek
Year of Publication: 
2015
Citation: 
[Journal:] Procedia – Economics and Finance [ISSN:] 2212-5671 [Volume:] 24 [Pages:] 306-312
Abstract: 
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we study the patent hold-up problem in game-theoretic framework. We show that in subgame perfect equilibrium of the patent hold-up game the innovating manufacturer exerts reduced effort to develop the new product and the patent holder obtains the entire value of product innovation. Second, we show that royalty stacking, which is believed to magnify the patent hold-up, may cause less severe problems than the ones predicted by Lemley and Shapiro [11] when competition on the downstream product market is introduced.
Subjects: 
patent hold-up
royalty stacking
downstream competition
JEL: 
O32
O34
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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