Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127420
Authors: 
Laps, Jochen
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 603
Abstract: 
The paper analyzes the welfare consequences of insuring mortality risk by means of standard, fully funded Social Security pensions when individuals wish to make transfers to their heirs. In the presence of uninsured mortality risk, within-family transfers depend on realized lifespan. While crowding out private transfers, Social Security provides transfer insurance and insurance of the ex ante risk of future generations inheriting a particular amount of transfer wealth. We find that, once ex ante insurance is taken into account, Social Security is welfare improving over the long-run as long as capital is not too productive and the transfer motive is not too strong. Altruists gain far less from Social Security than egoists.
Subjects: 
Uninsured mortality risk
social security pensions
bequest motive
bequest insurance
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
442.89 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.