Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127408
Authors: 
Goeschl, Timo
Perino, Grischa
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper Series, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 591
Abstract: 
The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold-up effect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA 'brown'. Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be better off without them.
Subjects: 
International climate policy
diffusion of innovations
intellectual property rights
hold-up problem
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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