Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/127400 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper Series No. 588
Verlag: 
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, Heidelberg
Zusammenfassung: 
In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: while they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25 to 50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that "four remain many" even with 1200 periods.
Schlagwörter: 
imitation
experiment
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
469.32 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.